Suspect device may have posibility to be blocked by lmh_read when resume,
and we do not need to get the details about sensors which supported by LMH Lite,
so remove lmh lite driver to avoid resume hang risk.

Bug: 80022235
Test: Thermal-engine work properly

Change-Id: I8d7052246aa9f2c8669132931dc91893c43d30cd
Signed-off-by: TeYuan Wang <kamewang@google.com>

July 2018.1

Bug: 79365489
Change-Id: I5d8a5434e5d878f5c420bfc97c8805f94119a791
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mentz <danielmentz@google.com>

commit 65d8fc77 upstream.

When dealing with key handling for shared futexes, we can drastically reduce
the usage/need of the page lock. 1) For anonymous pages, the associated futex
object is the mm_struct which does not require the page lock. 2) For inode
based, keys, we can check under RCU read lock if the page mapping is still
valid and take reference to the inode. This just leaves one rare race that
requires the page lock in the slow path when examining the swapcache.

Additionally realtime users currently have a problem with the page lock being
contended for unbounded periods of time during futex operations.

Task A
     get_futex_key()
     lock_page()
    ---> preempted

Now any other task trying to lock that page will have to wait until
task A gets scheduled back in, which is an unbound time.

With this patch, we pretty much have a lockless futex_get_key().

Experiments show that this patch can boost/speedup the hashing of shared
futexes with the perf futex benchmarks (which is good for measuring such
change) by up to 45% when there are high (> 100) thread counts on a 60 core
Westmere. Lower counts are pretty much in the noise range or less than 10%,
but mid range can be seen at over 30% overall throughput (hash ops/sec).
This makes anon-mem shared futexes much closer to its private counterpart.

Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
[ Ported on top of thp refcount rework, changelog, comments, fixes. ]
Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: dave@stgolabs.net
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1455045314-8305-3-git-send-email-dave@stgolabs.net


Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Bug: 74250718
Change-Id: I4104985900c2f0ff7d7a5835c56fed15cf994f0e

Add conditional check when sending VIDIOC_MSM_OIS_CFG.

Bug: 38258851
Change-Id: I095418b47409f5291e5c3fcfd227897022f77f71
CRs-Fixed:2078155
Signed-off-by: Tanvi Aggarwal <tanvia@codeaurora.org>

If the list search in sg_get_rq_mark() fails to find a valid request, we
return a bogus element. This then can later lead to a GPF in
sg_remove_scat().

So don't return bogus Sg_requests in sg_get_rq_mark() but NULL in case
the list search doesn't find a valid request.

Bug: 79090045
Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>
Acked-by: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
(cherry picked from commit 48ae8484)

Change-Id: If95d1a8eef3748c9937201e524184b89a5eaaf2e
Bug: 75300370

commit aa65d11a upstream.

When we unlock our spinlock to copy data to user we may get
disabled by USB host and free the whole list of completed out
requests including the one from which we are copying the data
to user memory.

To prevent from this let's remove our working element from
the list and place it back only if there is sth left when we
finish with it.

Fixes: 99c51500 ("usb: gadget: hidg: register OUT INT endpoint for SET_REPORT")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Tested-by: David Lechner <david@lechnology.com>
Bug: 74447444
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Opasiak <k.opasiak@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jerry Zhang <zhangjerry@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: Ia5d3da0952d87cd82a9e476e90a7cd3633536d94

Check for debugfs ops buf size passed before reading
to eliminate the possibility of reading out of bounds.

Bug: 77528653
Change-Id: I28fd60ce93256b6b0bad62b449092a891cc15463
Signed-off-by: Karthikeyan Mani <kmani@codeaurora.org>

Currently, there is no check of:
1) Firmware event parameters in dbglog_parse_debug_logs(), which can
result in integer underflow.
2) Number of dbg log args against the total length, which can result in
buffer over-read.

To fix this, compare size of firmware event parameters and number of
dbg log args with total buffer length.

Bug: 77528512
Change-Id: I981441ecf8e866afc00cf2e0e316779c8cc803c6
CRs-Fixed: 2205372
Signed-off-by: Ecco Park <eccopark@google.com>

Check whether the data_len is valid, to avoid
out-of-bounds reading issue.

Bug: 77528805

Change-Id: If9fef306f455fcc1bd34d7aa713dd5c5535b8bfb
CRs-Fixed: 2170392
Signed-off-by: Ahmed ElArabawy <arabawy@google.com>

commit fbe0e839 upstream.

UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:

 UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
 signed integer overflow:
 0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'

Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.

Bug: 76106267
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com


Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: Iccefa7465b9cc6475d00c0509af7988e351e6341

The list_for_each macro was not used correctly, where the intermediate
variable would be LIST_POISON, resulting in a untrusted pointer
dereference. Switch to using list_for_each_entry_safe to for safe
removal of a list entry.

Bug: 72956998
Change-Id: I0e0fd5dd9f251b5093d6e9d6335387512ec59249
Signed-off-by: Mahesh Sivasubramanian <msivasub@codeaurora.org>

Add sanity check for wmi TLV header length before padding/shrinking
elements in a wmi which has a variable length for its TLV structure.

Currently, the TLV length is not checked so its maximum value could
be 65535 which results in a hugh count for elements. Number of elements
is used to terminate the loop for padding/shrinking. If the number
was too large, there would be memory overflow.

CRs-Fixed: 2169157
Bug: 77527719
Change-Id: I99c700d62f8c0db84cbd95fc6efcb5249b89eb1d
Signed-off-by: Ecco Park <eccopark@google.com>

As the length datatype is signed, an attacker can both overflow
the calculation or supply a negative number to trick the check
into returning an chosen chunk. This can have undesired
consequences. Always use unsigned integer types for length
values.

Bug: 63165135
Change-Id: Ifde2f0d35129014b976507f7723a319c53fabddf
Acked-by: Thyagarajan Venkatanarayanan <venkatan@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tharun Kumar Merugu <mtharu@codeaurora.org>

July 2018.1

Bug: 79365489
Change-Id: I7a185838556748ed03163beaf079c6327753e811
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mentz <danielmentz@google.com>

This reverts commit 2aabc328.

Bug: 72957321
Bug: 79219092
Change-Id: Ia664b7fbf0c08807348d6948a5e18691b62f4f11
Signed-off-by: Stuart Scott <stuartscott@google.com>

June 2018.1

Bug: 76445910

Add data_len check in wma_nan_rsp_event_handler()
to avoid OOB access.

Bug: 74237168
Change-Id: Iff42da84567381a4b64bc07e69ff1a0cd4b5a543
CRs-Fixed: 2170630

Bug: 71363680
Change-Id: I1a07a74cae96b4548df4cb089e31485734149280
Signed-off-by: Chenglu Lin <chenglulin@android.com>

There a possibility of out-of-bound read because of not
validating source buffer length against length that about
to be copied. The patch adds proper check for validating
length before copying data

Bug: 70399602
CRs-Fixed: 2163793
Change-Id: I7c93839d0c4d83024ce23a0ce494d09dd08567a9
Signed-off-by: Hardik Arya <harya@codeaurora.org>

Fragment count will be larger than the upper limit of
cvg_nbuf_cb->extra_flag.num which would lead to an overread
of fragment length. Upper limit check for fragment count
is added in this change.

Change-Id: Icc078b2efee554ac84377b5edd90d0a5c7a61f98
CRs-Fixed: 2129566
Bug: 72957387
Signed-off-by: Ecco Park <eccopark@google.com>

Variable map may pointing to the same buffer on race conditions
in functions fastrpc_internal_mmap and fastrpc_internal_munmap,
use mutex to avoid race conditions on same buffer.

Bug: 72957546
Change-Id: I96ed884c44a36f574677ba3ba189dfbf2ce3751d
Acked-by: Krishnaiah Tadakamalla <ktadakam@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tharun Kumar Merugu <mtharu@codeaurora.org>

Check for the validity of tx_desc_id when received the htt message of
HTT_T2H_MSG_TYPE_MGMT_TX_COMPL_IND from firmware to ensure the buffer
overwrite does not happen.

Bug: 74237532

Change-Id: I0afc781b7fff303525352b817e7eb60b8b05e4d3
CRs-Fixed: 2157917
Signed-off-by: Ahmed ElArabawy <arabawy@google.com>

commit 48a4ff1c upstream.

A malicious USB device with crafted descriptors can cause the kernel
to access unallocated memory by setting the bNumInterfaces value too
high in a configuration descriptor.  Although the value is adjusted
during parsing, this adjustment is skipped in one of the error return
paths.

This patch prevents the problem by setting bNumInterfaces to 0
initially.  The existing code already sets it to the proper value
after parsing is complete.

Bug: 71751622
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: I89bb5c8e48e7654aac05a7936f4ee92e1481ca65

In the code, start_fetch can try to access the
buffer pointer variable after free, as the
same pointer can be freed at RELEASE_BUF call
at the same time.

CRs-Fixed: 2149998
Change-Id: Ic83f22336504cf67afe12131f791eee25477f011
Signed-off-by: Meera Gande <mgande@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: VijayaKumar T M <vtmuni@codeaurora.org>

Bug: 69065862
Signed-off-by: Sean Callanan <spyffe@google.com>

Move NBUF_UPDATE_TX_PKT_COUNT in ol_tx_completion_handler to make
sure that netbuf is not accessed after it is freed.

Bug: 71638332

Change-Id: Ifba9de788b11ce8cb323827d10f8005029609231
CRs-fixed: 1040612
Signed-off-by: Ahmed ElArabawy <arabawy@google.com>

Send context ID in rpc header instead of context pointer.
Validate context ID received in response and get context pointer.

Bug: 74237782
Change-Id: I9cfd10d0c1b25c3085b8e15c7ca1c8ff214bf10d
Acked-by: Viswanatham Paduchuri <vpaduchu@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tharun Kumar Merugu <mtharu@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Steve Pfetsch <spfetsch@google.com>

Validate context pointer using magic number instead of searching
through context list. It removes the usage of spin lock in interrupt
handler for avoiding deadlock and reducing latency.

Bug: 74237782
Change-Id: I2492a7984a8d6545618a9cfb7a2d239d03ddd5a2
Acked-by: Viswanatham Paduchuri <vpaduchu@qti.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tharun Kumar Merugu <mtharu@codeaurora.org>

when comparing a signed value vs sizeof, make sure
it's >= 0 so that when promoted to signed for comparison
it won't lead to unexpected results.

Bug: 70528036
Change-Id: I99a1220598e67e3ce5c99d425e84c79639121838
Signed-off-by: Andrew Chant <achant@google.com>

Add correct conditional check for len in dci_process_ctrl_status() to
prevent buffer overflow.

Bug: 70528036
Change-Id: Id73ed1c8b104428eceef0544ce2858160cc08fd2
Signed-off-by: Sreelakshmi Gownipalli <sgownipa@codeaurora.org>

The buffer length is unsigned at all layers, but gets cast to int and
checked in hidp_process_report and can lead to a buffer overflow.
Switch len parameter to unsigned int to resolve issue.

Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@google.com>
Fixes: 678af93e46ac10318b54f2f0c9abbdfe75c4e078 ("HID: Bluetooth: hidp: make sure input buffers are big enough")
Bug: 65853588
Change-Id: I779ce783ae7c3bce8c5a66c0954ef31347e42cfc

The user can pass bad data into kgsl_ioctl_gpuobj_sync(). If
_copy_from_user() fails do to bad data, undo any current
references taken through this ioctl call.

Bug: 74237606
Change-Id: I56195520b9dadba20ee419658fc2cbb282b8449c
Signed-off-by: Carter Cooper <ccooper@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: samit vats <svats@codeaurora.org>

commit 4dca6ea1 upstream.

When the request_key() syscall is not passed a destination keyring, it
links the requested key (if constructed) into the "default" request-key
keyring.  This should require Write permission to the keyring.  However,
there is actually no permission check.

This can be abused to add keys to any keyring to which only Search
permission is granted.  This is because Search permission allows joining
the keyring.  keyctl_set_reqkey_keyring(KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_SESSION_KEYRING)
then will set the default request-key keyring to the session keyring.
Then, request_key() can be used to add keys to the keyring.

Both negatively and positively instantiated keys can be added using this
method.  Adding negative keys is trivial.  Adding a positive key is a
bit trickier.  It requires that either /sbin/request-key positively
instantiates the key, or that another thread adds the key to the process
keyring at just the right time, such that request_key() misses it
initially but then finds it in construct_alloc_key().

Fix this bug by checking for Write permission to the keyring in
construct_get_dest_keyring() when the default keyring is being used.

We don't do the permission check for non-default keyrings because that
was already done by the earlier call to lookup_user_key().  Also,
request_key_and_link() is currently passed a 'struct key *' rather than
a key_ref_t, so the "possessed" bit is unavailable.

We also don't do the permission check for the "requestor keyring", to
continue to support the use case described by commit 8bbf4976
("KEYS: Alter use of key instantiation link-to-keyring argument") where
/sbin/request-key recursively calls request_key() to add keys to the
original requestor's destination keyring.  (I don't know of any users
who actually do that, though...)

Fixes: 3e30148c ("[PATCH] Keys: Make request-key create an authorisation key")
Bug: 71751178
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: I22bf395912a0d4dd84f27d27138bd9d03dcce5ab

commit <af3ff804> upstream.

Because the HMAC template didn't check that its underlying hash
algorithm is unkeyed, trying to use "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))"
through AF_ALG or through KEYCTL_DH_COMPUTE resulted in the inner HMAC
being used without having been keyed, resulting in sha3_update() being
called without sha3_init(), causing a stack buffer overflow.

This is a very old bug, but it seems to have only started causing real
problems when SHA-3 support was added (requires CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3)
because the innermost hash's state is ->import()ed from a zeroed buffer,
and it just so happens that other hash algorithms are fine with that,
but SHA-3 is not.  However, there could be arch or hardware-dependent
hash algorithms also affected; I couldn't test everything.

Fix the bug by introducing a function crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey()
which tests whether a shash algorithm is keyed.  Then update the HMAC
template to require that its underlying hash algorithm is unkeyed.

Here is a reproducer:

    #include <linux/if_alg.h>
    #include <sys/socket.h>

    int main()
    {
        int algfd;
        struct sockaddr_alg addr = {
            .salg_type = "hash",
            .salg_name = "hmac(hmac(sha3-512-generic))",
        };
        char key[4096] = { 0 };

        algfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0);
        bind(algfd, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr));
        setsockopt(algfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, sizeof(key));
    }

Here was the KASAN report from syzbot:

    BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in memcpy include/linux/string.h:341  [inline]
    BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0  crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
    Write of size 4096 at addr ffff8801cca07c40 by task syzkaller076574/3044

    CPU: 1 PID: 3044 Comm: syzkaller076574 Not tainted 4.14.0-mm1+ #25
    Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS  Google 01/01/2011
    Call Trace:
      __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
      dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53
      print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252
      kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
      kasan_report+0x25b/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
      check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline]
      check_memory_region+0x137/0x190 mm/kasan/kasan.c:267
      memcpy+0x37/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:303
      memcpy include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
      sha3_update+0xdf/0x2e0 crypto/sha3_generic.c:161
      crypto_shash_update+0xcb/0x220 crypto/shash.c:109
      shash_finup_unaligned+0x2a/0x60 crypto/shash.c:151
      crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
      hmac_finup+0x182/0x330 crypto/hmac.c:152
      crypto_shash_finup+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:165
      shash_digest_unaligned+0x9e/0xd0 crypto/shash.c:172
      crypto_shash_digest+0xc4/0x120 crypto/shash.c:186
      hmac_setkey+0x36a/0x690 crypto/hmac.c:66
      crypto_shash_setkey+0xad/0x190 crypto/shash.c:64
      shash_async_setkey+0x47/0x60 crypto/shash.c:207
      crypto_ahash_setkey+0xaf/0x180 crypto/ahash.c:200
      hash_setkey+0x40/0x90 crypto/algif_hash.c:446
      alg_setkey crypto/af_alg.c:221 [inline]
      alg_setsockopt+0x2a1/0x350 crypto/af_alg.c:254
      SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1851 [inline]
      SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1830
      entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96

Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Bug: 71752561
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: Icfc16f18b0454ecc886cab0cdf9e93c018f2a44d

Cleanup ION cache maintenance code to properly validate the target of
userspace cache maintenance requests.

Bug: 72957321
Change-Id: I55b8e3584c59634f95250bc7c0bce5d8d70e6a13
Signed-off-by: Liam Mark <lmark@codeaurora.org>

commit 2eb9eabf upstream.

syzkaller with KASAN reported an out-of-bounds read in
asn1_ber_decoder().  It can be reproduced by the following command,
assuming CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y:

    keyctl add asymmetric desc $'\x30\x30' @s

The bug is that the length of an ASN.1 data value isn't validated in the
case where it is encoded using the short form, causing the decoder to
read past the end of the input buffer.  Fix it by validating the length.

The bug report was:

    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in asn1_ber_decoder+0x10cb/0x1730 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233
    Read of size 1 at addr ffff88003cccfa02 by task syz-executor0/6818

    CPU: 1 PID: 6818 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc7-00008-g5f479447d983 #2
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
    Call Trace:
     __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline]
     dump_stack+0xb3/0x10b lib/dump_stack.c:52
     print_address_description+0x79/0x2a0 mm/kasan/report.c:252
     kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
     kasan_report+0x236/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409
     __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:427
     asn1_ber_decoder+0x10cb/0x1730 lib/asn1_decoder.c:233
     x509_cert_parse+0x1db/0x650 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:89
     x509_key_preparse+0x64/0x7a0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
     asymmetric_key_preparse+0xcb/0x1a0 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
     key_create_or_update+0x347/0xb20 security/keys/key.c:855
     SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
     SyS_add_key+0x1cd/0x340 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
    RIP: 0033:0x447c89
    RSP: 002b:00007fca7a5d3bd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000f8
    RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fca7a5d46cc RCX: 0000000000447c89
    RDX: 0000000020006f4a RSI: 0000000020006000 RDI: 0000000020001ff5
    RBP: 0000000000000046 R08: fffffffffffffffd R09: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000002 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fca7a5d49c0 R15: 00007fca7a5d4700

Fixes: 42d5ec27 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Bug: 73827422
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: I49455e7006a338e15326c9c3e1a2607ebf09baf4

FW memory dump feature is no longer used. Hence remove FW memory
dump feature code changes.

Change-Id: Ida655f83630c369df746e7c0c9d61a8fee2932a2
CRs-Fixed: 2120605
Bug: 65542521
Signed-off-by: Srinivas Girigowda <sgirigow@codeaurora.org>

The FASTRPC_IOCTL_INIT ioctl registers a pointer for later
access without checking that it is a user pointer.  This could
allow arbitrary kernel memory access.

This patch verifies that the pointer is a user pointer.

Bug: 63165064
Change-Id: I936f73a2c2029f9e7ca12cc8fc06d0698e6710c0
Signed-off-by: Tharun Kumar Merugu <mtharu@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Sean Callanan <spyffe@google.com>

Add mutex lock to ensure atomic access to core handle
in CPE alloc and dealloc sessions.

CRs-Fixed: 2169403
Bug: 62536960
Signed-off-by: Vaishnavi Kommaraju <vkommara@codeaurora.org>
Change-Id: Iaf95e462e6ec8bfa711013d2239140b51d897eff

[ Upstream commit 749439bf ]

The logic in __ip6_append_data() assumes that the MTU is at least large
enough for the headers.  A device's MTU may be adjusted after being
added while sendmsg() is processing data, resulting in
__ip6_append_data() seeing any MTU.  For an mtu smaller than the size of
the fragmentation header, the math results in a negative 'maxfraglen',
which causes problems when refragmenting any previous skb in the
skb_write_queue, leaving it possibly malformed.

Instead sendmsg returns EINVAL when the mtu is calculated to be less
than IPV6_MIN_MTU.

Found by syzkaller:
kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2064!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Dumping ftrace buffer:
   (ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 14216 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc4+ #2
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
task: ffff8801d0b68580 task.stack: ffff8801ac6b8000
RIP: 0010:__skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2064 [inline]
RIP: 0010:__ip6_make_skb+0x18cf/0x1f70 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1617
RSP: 0018:ffff8801ac6bf570 EFLAGS: 00010216
RAX: 0000000000010000 RBX: 0000000000000028 RCX: ffffc90003cce000
RDX: 00000000000001b8 RSI: ffffffff839df06f RDI: ffff8801d9478ca0
RBP: ffff8801ac6bf780 R08: ffff8801cc3f1dbc R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8801ac6bf7a0 R11: 43cb4b7b1948a9e7 R12: ffff8801cc3f1dc8
R13: ffff8801cc3f1d40 R14: 0000000000001036 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS:  00007f43d740c700(0000) GS:ffff8801dc100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f7834984000 CR3: 00000001d79b9000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
 ip6_finish_skb include/net/ipv6.h:911 [inline]
 udp_v6_push_pending_frames+0x255/0x390 net/ipv6/udp.c:1093
 udpv6_sendmsg+0x280d/0x31a0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1363
 inet_sendmsg+0x11f/0x5e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
 sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643
 SYSC_sendto+0x352/0x5a0 net/socket.c:1750
 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1718
 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4512e9
RSP: 002b:00007f43d740bc08 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000007180a8 RCX: 00000000004512e9
RDX: 000000000000002e RSI: 0000000020d08000 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 0000000000000086 R08: 00000000209c1000 R09: 000000000000001c
R10: 0000000000040800 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00000000004b9c69
R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000005 R15: 00000000202c2000
Code: 9e 01 fe e9 c5 e8 ff ff e8 7f 9e 01 fe e9 4a ea ff ff 48 89 f7 e8 52 9e 01 fe e9 aa eb ff ff e8 a8 b6 cf fd 0f 0b e8 a1 b6 cf fd <0f> 0b 49 8d 45 78 4d 8d 45 7c 48 89 85 78 fe ff ff 49 8d 85 ba
RIP: __skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2064 [inline] RSP: ffff8801ac6bf570
RIP: __ip6_make_skb+0x18cf/0x1f70 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1617 RSP: ffff8801ac6bf570

Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Bug: 65023306
Signed-off-by: Mike Maloney <maloney@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: If7663cd538ca686c8a7874181b45bdb48630f538

commit e0058f3a upstream.

In asn1_ber_decoder(), indefinitely-sized ASN.1 items were being passed
to the action functions before their lengths had been computed, using
the bogus length of 0x80 (ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH).  This resulted in
reading data past the end of the input buffer, when given a specially
crafted message.

Fix it by rearranging the code so that the indefinite length is resolved
before the action is called.

This bug was originally found by fuzzing the X.509 parser in userspace
using libFuzzer from the LLVM project.

KASAN report (cleaned up slightly):

    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcpy ./include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
    BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in x509_fabricate_name.constprop.1+0x1a4/0x940 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:366
    Read of size 128 at addr ffff880035dd9eaf by task keyctl/195

    CPU: 1 PID: 195 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-09238-g1d3b78bbc6e9 #26
    Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-20171110_100015-anatol 04/01/2014
    Call Trace:
     __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline]
     dump_stack+0xd1/0x175 lib/dump_stack.c:53
     print_address_description+0x78/0x260 mm/kasan/report.c:252
     kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline]
     kasan_report+0x23f/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
     memcpy+0x1f/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:302
     memcpy ./include/linux/string.h:341 [inline]
     x509_fabricate_name.constprop.1+0x1a4/0x940 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:366
     asn1_ber_decoder+0xb4a/0x1fd0 lib/asn1_decoder.c:447
     x509_cert_parse+0x1c7/0x620 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:89
     x509_key_preparse+0x61/0x750 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c:174
     asymmetric_key_preparse+0xa4/0x150 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c:388
     key_create_or_update+0x4d4/0x10a0 security/keys/key.c:850
     SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:122 [inline]
     SyS_add_key+0xe8/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96

    Allocated by task 195:
     __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab.c:3675 [inline]
     __kmalloc_node+0x47/0x60 mm/slab.c:3682
     kvmalloc ./include/linux/mm.h:540 [inline]
     SYSC_add_key security/keys/keyctl.c:104 [inline]
     SyS_add_key+0x19e/0x290 security/keys/keyctl.c:62
     entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0x96

Fixes: 42d5ec27 ("X.509: Add an ASN.1 decoder")
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Bug: 73827422
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Change-Id: Ie5738889d965b8e45cf193ee6d098bab964d9675